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Abstract. In this article we try to disentangle the constraints between traditional lines of political 
polarization (left-right placement) and newer distinctions (materialist/postmaterialist values) 
among mass publics. It is shown that voting or party preference is most clearly related to the 
left-right placement of the respondents. However, this placement is directly and strongly depend- 
ent on the materialist/postmaterialist orientation, while background variables like education, 
income and age are linked to voting via this value orientation. The materialist/postmaterialist 
orientation appears to be the present-day interpretation of the dominant political conflict in 
advanced industrial society. Although alignments and orientations count for .I substantive part of 
the variance in voting, the power of these models to predict the actual vote of people turns out to 
be rather poor. 
Especially in Western European countries, political ideas and perceptions 
have been summarized for decades with the use of positions on a single 
left-right dimension. Usually, this dimension is considered to reflect some 
general stand on questions concerning the socio-economic structure of society. 
A more left position means that one favours ‘social change in the direction of 
greater equality’,’ while a location on the right side represents opposition to 
such changes. Political cleavages are expressed by associating the terms left 
and right with proletarian and bourgeois interests respectively. Although the 
process of ‘de-alignment’ seems to have eroded these linkages, the left-right 
dimension is still considered the most important generalized orientation frame 
for politics in many countries.’ 
In search of the explanation of recent social and political developments in 
advanced industrial societies, many authors noticed the limitations of the 
traditional left-right scheme. In addition, a change in value orientations was 
assumed to deal with more actual political cleavages. According to this view, 
the wave of political activism in the 1960s, the rise of the feminist movement, 
the concern for the environment and disarmament, and eventually the founda- 
tion of Green parties in several countries, are all the result of a shift in the 
political priorities among people. Instead of docility, material advantages, and 
traditions, the post-war generations in particular tend to emphasize self- 
fulfilment, independence and emancipation. Consequently, the traditional, 
class-related political cleavages among the population gradually lose their 
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relevance and new conflict dimensions arise. One of the most fruitful concep- 
tualizations of this new dimension seems to be Inglehart’s idea of the contrast 
between materialist and postmaterialist value orientations.3 
The interpretation of social and political change in terms of arising new 
conflict dimensions does not imply a rejection of the use of the left-right 
dimension. On the contrary. The advantage of introducing the idea of new 
cleavages is that they overlap, or at least complement, the old cleavages, and 
so add to our understanding of the dynamics of political change. The main 
problem to be discussed here is whether or not it makes sense to use the 
materialist/postmaterialist value orientation in addition to the left-right place- 
ment in explanations and predictions of party preferences or voting. 
1. Cleavages and party preferences 
The impact of the left-right placement and the materialist/postmaterialist 
value orientation on the party preferences or voting of people can be concep- 
tualized in several ways. Many of the logical possibilities in this field have been 
put forward by Inglehart, his allies, or his opponents.4 
A first way to interprete these linkages is to present the value orientations as 
an alternative to the left-right placement. As a result of the gradual disappear- 
ance of class-related conflicts in advanced industrial societies, the correspond- 
ing political expression in terms of the left-right dimension loses its relevance. 
New conflict dimensions will replace the old one, and more and more people 
will base their party preference on their interpretation of new cleavages. In 
other words, the decline of industrial society means the decline of the rele- 
vance of the left-right continuum as a way of expressing class-related conflicts. 
The idea of a gradual shift from old to new cleavages does not seem to be 
very realistic. Instead of presenting a new cleavage as an alternative, it is put 
forward as a complement of the left-right dimension. In this view, the left-right 
continuum remains the predominant frame of reference, but now the material- 
ist/postmaterialist value orientation is presented as a new dimension within the 
left (cf. Kaase and Klingemann 1982). People on the left side agree on the 
importance of socio-economic change in an egalitarian direction, but they 
disagree on the priority of materialist and postmaterialist values. So, adding 
the idea of new cleavages means that the conflict between the ‘old left’ and the 
‘new left’ is incorporated in the analyses of party preferences and voting. 
The third way to link left-right placement and value orientations is to see the 
latter as an interpretation of the former. Since the majority of people in every 
country show materialist or mixed orientations, postmaterialists have to plead 
for changes in order to realize their political goals. A positive attitude towards 
social change is associated with leftist political stands. Consequently, postma- 
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terialists will be on the left side of the left-right dimension and prefer left 
parties (cf. Inglehart 1979: 335; Inglehart and Rabier 1986: 474; Van Deth 
1984: 190-191). In this view, it is the readiness to change of the left, irrespec- 
tive of the socio-economic interpretation of these changes, that attracts people 
with a postmaterialist value orientation. The interesting point here is that this 
interpretation contradicts the notion that party preference basically is a result 
of class position. As a new middle class, postmaterialists should favour parties 
from the centre or the right side. However, their need to support political 
change urges them to prefer left parties. So, the introduction of new cleavages 
leads to quite different predictions about the party preference of, especially, 
the postmaterialists than can be obtained on the basis of the old cleavages only. 
The fourth and last explanation of voting or party preferences to be men- 
tioned here, is the rejection of the idea that the materialist/postmaterialist 
value orientation contributes anything substantial or substantive once the 
left-right placement is taken into consideration (cf. Van der Eijk and Niemol- 
ler 1986, 1987). According to this line of reasoning, the left-right dimension 
still represents the most important ideological cleavage among the populations 
of advanced industrial societies. That is not to say that supporters of this 
interpretation stick to some old-fashioned class-related interpretation of the 
left-right dimension, or that they deny the relevance of the materialidpostma- 
terialist value orientation in the analyses of political change. The point is that 
those new cleavages are not (yet?) transformed into party preferences or 
perceptions of the parties, while there are no reasons to expect a decline of the 
usefulness of the left-right dimension in this field. This latter dimension 
functions as generalized frame of reference for political or ideological think- 
ing. Its precise contextual meaning differs from time to time and from place to 
place. 
These four divergent views represent the broad lines of available interpreta- 
tions of the relationships between values, left-right placements and party 
preferences. There are, to be sure, other ways of linking these three concepts. 
If we leave aside the possibility that party preference or voting can be a cause 
instead of an effect of the left-right placement and/or the materialist/postmate- 
rialist value orientation, then this set of four interpretations seems to be a 
reasonable start for a more detailed, empirically based analysis. 
2. Operationalization and measurement 
An empirical analysis of the relative impacts of the left-right placement and the 
materialist/postmaterialist value orientation on party preferences, requires 
independent measures for each of these three concepts. Usually, left-right 
placement is registered by presenting a self-anchoring scale formed by ten 
20 
horizontally placed boxes. The terms ‘left’ and ‘right’ are placed at the left and 
right side respectively. Without giving the respondents any further informa- 
tion, they are asked to mark their own position on the dimension. 
The materialist/postmaterialist value orientation is measured in a much 
more complex way. In the most simple variant of the procedure, people are 
asked to rank four cards according to their own preferences. Each card 
contains a political goal. Those respondents who give top priority to the 
postmaterialist statements are labeled ‘postmaterialists’; if materialist items 
are selected first, people are called ‘materialists’. Respondents placing both 
materialist and postmaterialist items among their first few choices, are labeled 
‘mixed’. Several variants of this instrument have been used with 4,s or 12 it ern^.^ 
Party preference or voting is measured in straightforward ways: people are 
simply asked to mention the party they prefer or recently voted for, or the 
party they would vote for if there were general elections tomorrow. While 
these registrations seem to be rather harmless and uncomplicated, severe 
conceptual and methodological problems are encountered when we try to link 
the left-right placement and the materialist/postmaterialist orientation to par- 
ty preference or voting. 
In order to apply sophisticated multivariate analysis techniques to test the 
interpretations presented in the previous section, an order or a ranking of the 
parties is required. For the left-right placement of parties two methods have 
been tried. Some authors simply rely on expertise or folk wisdom to place the 
political parties on a dimension (cf. Castles and Mair 1984). The risks involved 
in terms of reliability, contamination, and verification are obvious, and this 
method does not seem to be useful for the analyses required here. A sub- 
stantial improvement can be obtained by asking the respondents to place each 
party on a left-right dimension. By using the average position of a party on that 
dimension, we have a second way to identify parties on a left-right dimension.6 
However, it is hard to imagine how this method can be used in the case of the 
materialist/postmaterialist value orientation. Van der Eij k and Niemoller 
(1986) solved this problem by classifying parties according to the relative 
number of voters with materialist or postmaterialist orientations for each 
party. We will return to this suggestion below. For the moment, the main 
conclusion is that there are no more or less equivalent measures available for 
party preference or voting in terms of the left-right dimension and the materi- 
alist/postmaterialist value orientation. 
Apart from these operational complications, defining party preference or 
voting as a dependent variable presents some other, perhaps even more 
serious, complications. Suppose that we find a useful way to place the parties 
on a left-right dimension. It will be hardly surprising to find, in an empirical 
analysis of party preference, that people who call themselves ‘right’ prefer 
parties on the right, or people on the left preferring leftist parties. Does that 
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result mean that the materialist/postmaterialist value orientation is irrelevant 
for party preferences? Obviously not. A hypothetical order or ranking of 
parties along some materialist/postmaterialist dimension probably would lead 
to the conclusion that postmaterialists have a greater tendency to vote for 
postmaterialist parties than materialists have. As Prewitt and Nie put it so 
nicely: ‘We would not be surprised to learn that persons who call themselves 
Catholic are more likely to be found on Sunday in Catholic than in Protestant 
churches’ (1971: 487). The question, then, is how to obtain an order or ranking 
of the parties without introducing a clear bias for either the left-right place- 
ment or the materialist/postmaterialist orientation from the beginning? 
3. Characterizing parties 
Using several characteristics to typify political parties as a dependent variable 
only makes sense if the number of parties allows for at least some differ- 
entiation. The Dutch multi-party system is among the few political systems in 
the world that incorporate a magnitude of parties differing in many respects. 
Furthermore, the pure postmaterialists constitute a substantial minority in the 
Netherlands while this orientation is less clearly present in other countries. 
These two reasons seems to  designate the Dutch political system as an excel- 
lent location to test the expectations on the relative impact of left-right 
placement and materialist/postmaterialist value orientation on party prefer- 
ences or voting.’ 
Van der Eijk and Niemoller (1986: 266, 269) used the relative number of 
postmaterialists among the voters for a particular party in the Netherlands as 
the criterion to rank that party on a ‘postmaterialist dimension’. This relative 
number of postmaterialists is the average percentage of postmaterialists for 
that party in six large-scale surveys (Eurobarometer 13 up to Eurobarometer 
18). In a similar way, the parties are ranked on a ‘materialist dimension’. Van 
der Eijk and Niemoller used these two scales in their analysis of the impact of 
left-right placement and materialist/postmaterialist orientation in the Dutch 
Parliamentary Election Study of 1981 . 8  In fact, they performed three sepurufe 
analyses with the left-right placement and value orientation as the main 
independent variables, and reported voting behaviour scored according to 1) 
the mean placement of the party voted for on a left-right scale, or 2) the mean 
percentage of postmaterialists among the voters for that party, or 3) the mean 
percentage of materialists. Their conclusion simply is that the materialid 
postmaterialist orientation is not a new electoral dimension: ‘. . . postmaterial- 
ism is shown to be dependent on ideological left-right orientations rather than 
being an independent and rivaling influence on political choice’ (Van der Eijk 
and Niemoller 1986: 251). Instead of discussing all the pitfalls encountered by 
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the analyses presented by Van der Eijk and Niemoller, we will show that a 
more balanced and unbiased way to deal with the dependent variable leads to 
quite different conclusions. 
A fair test of the impact of left-right placement and value orientation on 
voting requires that each party is characterized according to these cleavages. 
For that purpose, we pooled the available surveys of the same type held in the 
Netherlands in the period from 1976 through 1981. These data collections 
should have identical measures for left-right placement, value orientation and 
voting or party preference. It appeared that Eurobarometers 6 through Eu- 
robarometer 16 satisfy these   rite ria.^ With this pooled data set, for each party 
the relative number of postmaterialists and materialists is computed among 
the voters for that party. The left-right placement was treated in a similar way 
by computing the relative number of people with a left stand (scores 1 , 2  or 3) 
and the relative number of people with a right stand (scores 8, 9 or 10). The 
result is that each party is typified with four characteristics: the percentages 
leftists, rightists, postmaterialists, and materialists among its potential voters 
in the period before the national election of 1981.'"The figures obtained for the 
main Dutch parties in the period under consideration are presented in Table 1. 
We will not summarize these four characteristics in a single measure, but 
include their relationships in our empirical analyses. 
It should be stressed, moreover, that no use is made here of any perceptions 
of the parties apart from the vote intention reported by the respondents. 
Furthermore, the two rival independent variables are treated in the same way 
as much as possible. The objection can be raised that this procedure does not 
reduce the risks of contamination but, on the contrary, doubles the number of 
Table 1. Characteristics of Dutch political parties. 
Party: left-right placement value orientation 
% left %right ( n )  %post %mat (n) 
PvdA 
CDA 
VVD 
D66 
CPN 
PPR* 
PSP* 
DS70 
SGP 
GPV 
51 
3 
3 
20 
73 
64 
78 
9 
3 
1 
5 
44 
43 
5 
1 
2 
2 
9 
79 
68 
2669 
2646 
1335 
970 
90 
225 
218 
55 
121 
78 
21 
9 
10 
26 
29 
57 
65 
17 
3 
5 
30 
39 
34 
23 
19 
5 
5 
31 
49 
44 
2687 
2664 
1325 
967 
90 
22 1 
220 
52 
115 
86 
* the scores for PPR and PSP are merged in Eurobarometer 6 .  For that survey we attributed the 
votes for this combination of parties to each of the parties separately. 
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contaminated variables. Although this remark certainly makes sense in analys- 
es of voting and party preferences, we decided to apply the procedure for 
several reasons. First, the risks of contamination are lowered for both factors 
by not using perceptions of respondents to characterize the parties. Second, 
the main objective here is to disentangle the relative impacts of left-right 
placement and value orientation. If there is a risk of contamination, then this 
risk should be equally distributed among the predictor variables. Third, the 
parties are characterized by using data sets (the Eurobarometers) that are 
clearly distinct from the data we use for the analysis of voting (the Parlia- 
mentary Election Study of 1981). Fourth, the operationalization of voting as 
proposed is different but comparable to the operationalizations used by other 
researchers. Therefore, our results can be directly contrasted to conclusions to 
be found in the literature on the relevance of the materialist/postmaterialist 
orientation. As will be illustrated below, quite different results are obtained in 
empirical analyses when left-right placement and value orientation are treated 
in the same way as much as possible. 
4. Explaining voting 
As a first step towards assessing the empirical constraints among left-right 
placement, value orientation and voting, a simple model with voting as the 
dependent variable and the two other concepts as the independent variables 
will be constructed. As mentioned earlier, in the Dutch Parliamentary Elec- 
tion Study 1981 voting is operationalized as the reported voting behaviour in 
that election, and the party preferred is typified by four characteristics. For the 
left-right placement, the usual ten-points scale is used, while the materialist/ 
postmaterialist value orientation is measured with a three-points typology 
based on the factor scores on twelve items." 
The relative impact of the two independent variables on voting can be 
estimated with a set of simultaneous equations. Actually, we used the LISREL 
algorithms to compute these estimates.I2 Structural relationships are consid- 
ered to exist from left-right placement and value orientation on voting, and 
between the first two variables. The measurement model for voting consists of 
the four characteristics of the parties mentioned in the previous section. We 
tried to fit several variants of this model with the data. The variants with the 
best estimates, from a statistical point of view, are presented in Fig. 1. 
The best fitting models are the ones with value orientation as the alternative 
for the left-right placement and, with almost exactly the same statistical 
results, the model we introduced under the name interpretation, i.e. the 
left-right placement as intermediating factor between value orientation and 
voting. The explained variance for both models is very high. In the interpreta- 
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the interpretation model 
W,,, = .97 AGFl = ,998 Variance of ‘vote’ = .86 Max,,,dual = ,058 = fixed value 
the alternative model 
ITvee = .62 AGFl = ,999 Variance of ‘vote’ = .87 Max,,,,,,,, = .043 = fixed value 
Fig. I. LISREL-estimates of the interpretation and the alternative model. 
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tion model the left-right placement and the materialist/postmaterialist orien- 
tation explain most of the variance of voting; furthermore, the residuals are all 
very small. So, the solutions presented in Fig. 1 are to be taken as fitting very 
A closer look at the two solutions shows that the measurement models in 
both tests are almost identical. The indicators for the percentages of leftist 
voters and rightist voters fit somewhat better than the indicators for the 
percentages of postmaterialist and materialist voters. Because of possible 
contamination between the first two indicators and the last two, correlations 
between the residuals are introduced. Since we use the two extreme parts of 
the properties of the voters of a party, it can be expected that the indicators for 
each property are contaminated. For instance, avery large portion of material- 
ists for a party places severe limitations on the relative share of postmaterial- 
ists. By introducing the possibility of correlated residuals, this aspect is taken 
into account. As can be seen in Fig. 1 there is indeed some correlation between 
the re~idua1s.l~ 
A possible objection against our analyses so far, could be that there is no 
need for an elaborated objective and non-contaminated measure of voting, 
because people vote directly for some left or right party without some general 
translation of political orientations in a vote intention. A partial indication for 
the importance of such direct issue voting can be found in the residuals 
between left-right placement and the indicators of voting. These residuals are 
all less than .025 (not presented in Fig. 1.) Moreover, the correlations between 
the residuals do not point in the direction as suggested by the above mentioned 
critical view. The same holds for the materialistlpostmaterialist orientation in 
relation to the indicators of voting. On this point the conclusion must be that 
the measurement model is valid for the concept of voting or party preference. 
The fit of the two models presented in Fig. 1 is opposite to the results of an 
empirical test of the other models: the rejection model and the complement 
model. Typical for both these last models is that there is, in fact, no place for a 
more general value orientation as measured by the materialist/postmaterialist 
variable. A test of the most extreme model - a rejection of the relevance of the 
materialist/postmaterialist variable by explaining voting by left-right place- 
ment only - leads to a clear misspecification of the model on the data.15 
Furthermore, the thesis that postmaterialism should be a tie-breaker between 
some left parties (a radical version of the complement model) may be tested by 
a model in which left-right placement is exogeneous and considered to explain 
voting directly and via the materialist/postmaterialist orientation. In this case, 
we find a non-positive definite matrix of the residuals of the measurement 
model:16 a clear indication for the misspecification of the model. 
The empirical results obtained with the nuclear triangle of left-right place- 
ment, value orientation and voting can be seriously influenced by background 
well. 13 
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variables. Before we accept a conclusion about the relative impact of left-right 
placement and value orientation, a more elaborated model has to be consid- 
ered. In a model like that, the following background variables can be included: 
generation (indicated by age) as an indicator for the period in which one is 
socialized; income as an indicator for the degree in which materialist/postma- 
terialist issues are of direct relevance to the person; education as an indicator 
for socialization in the bourgeois values of the dominant class; and sex as an 
indicator for the socialization in specific societal roles. ” 
The best fitting and, at the same time, most elegant solution from a theoret- 
ical point of view, is presented in Fig. 2. The overall fit of the model is very 
good, and the parameters within the nuclear triangle are almost identical to the 
parameters of the limited models presented in Fig. 1. This suggests that the 
specific way of measuring voting or party preference is very stable. With the 
exception for the residuals between education and income on the one hand, 
and the indicators of voting on the other hand, none of the residuals are larger 
than .06. 
The most substantial relationships between the background variables and 
the left-right self placement, and these variables and the materialist/postmate- 
rialist value orientation are presented in Fig. 2. At the same time, these 
R2,, = .88 AGFl = .990 Variance of ‘vote’ = .83 R2L.R = .54 RZp.,., = .19 
max,,,,,,,, = -.088 = fixed value 
Fig. 2. LISREL-estimates of the elaborated model. 
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relationships are all in line with the expectations spelled out in the literature on 
value change.18 Sex is not related with the materialist/postmaterialist value 
orientation. Education and sex explain very little of left-right placement. As 
far as the background variables have an impact on the left-right placement, the 
materialist/postmaterialist orientation is needed as a mediating variable. This 
is an additional argument for the idea that the materialist/postmaterialist value 
orientation provides an interpretation of the voting behaviour along the left- 
right dimension. Consequently, the parameters between the materialist/post- 
materialist value orientation and income, education and age are at a consid- 
erable level. 
The results of these empirical analyses imply much more balanced and 
subtle conclusions on the relative impacts of left-right placement and value 
orientation than has been put forward recently. For instance, Van der Eijk and 
Niemoller’s (1987: 17) statement that ‘Post-materialist orientations are of 
negligible importance in a causal model of party choice’ is clearly an artefact of 
their biased treatment of the dependent variables. It should be noted that the 
present analyses are based on the very same data set as used by Van der Eijk 
and Niemoller (1986; 1987). However, both the theoretical and technical 
aspects of our work differ at several crucial  point^.'^ It will be no surprise that 
we reject Van der Eijk and Niemoller’s (1987: 28) final remark that their work 
‘. . . simultaneously undermines the validity of a great number of previous 
research findings’ in the field of materialism/ postmaterialism, as unconvincing 
and premature. 
5. Predicting voting 
So far, attention has been paid to the explanation of voting in terms of 
left-right placement and value orientation. Although the fit of the models 
presented in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 is very satisfying, the statistical properties 
reported reflect tendencies only in the covariance structures of the data. Since 
the proof of the pudding is in the eating, the next question to be answered is 
whether or not the model developed here can be used to predict the actual vote 
of a substantial number of respondents. 
Obviously, the prediction of the actual vote of the respondents cannot be 
derived from the same data set as the one used for the estimation of the 
parameters of the model. Because there is no identical data set available we 
decided to split the sample of the Dutch Parliamentary Election Study 1981 at 
random in two halves of 810 cases each. The first subsample is used to  estimate 
the parameters of the elaborated model developed in the previous section (see 
Fig. 2). The second subsample is reserved for the test of the prediction of the 
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actual vote. This procedure implies that parameter estimation and prediction 
of the vote are almost completely uncontaminated. 
In order to compare the actual vote with the predicted vote, a scaling of the 
parties along some dimension is needed. The scaling procedure is part of the 
measurement model of the first subsample. More precisely, the factor regres- 
sion coefficients of this subsample can be used to calculate voting behaviour of 
every repondent in terms of a one-dimensional voting profile of the parties.?" 
Every party vote now has a value on this single dimension. The results are 
standardized to facilitate a comparison with the predictions to be derived from 
the second subsample. These predictions are obtained by applying the LIS- 
REL-estimates of the first subsample to the relevant variables of the second 
subsample. In other words, the scores on left-right placement, value orien- 
tation, education, income, age, and sex of each respondent in the second 
subsample are used to compute their scores on the voting profile of the parties 
by using the parameters of the first subsample.2' Again, because the data and 
parameters originate from distinct subsamples, the results are standardized. 
The power of the model developed here to predict actual voting can be 
assessed in several ways. First, the correlation between the predicted and the 
actual vote is computed. This coefficient is .64 - a rather disappointing figure. 
However, the emphasis here is on actual prediction and not on yet another 
indication of tendencies. The second way to assess the power is to apply a 
variant of the nearest distance hypothesis of voting behaviour. In this case we 
assume that the prediction is correct if the predicted vote of a respondent is 
nearer to the actual vote than to any other party.** Now, the vote of 20.9 
percent of our respondents is correctly predicted with the estimates of our 
model. Leaving aside the very small DS'70 party increases this number to 24.8 
percent. These figures are even more disappointing than the correlation 
coefficient reported above. A third way to assess the power of our model is to 
weaken the specification of the predicted vote somewhat further. Suppose that 
the voter selects one of the two parties that demarcate the region his estimated 
party vote belongs to, irrespective of the distance to these parties. Applying 
this modified variant of the nearest distance hypothesis results in a correct 
prediction of 31.5 percent of the respondents. Leaving out the single DS'70- 
voter in the region between PvdA and CDA increases this number to 40.1 
percent. 
Although these figures indicate that the actual vote of a part of the respon- 
dents can be predicted with the model, it should be noted that a substantial 
proportion of our respondents select a party not in line with the expectations. 
Furthermore, the power of the model is clearly overestimated by using the 
percentages of correct votes as an indicator. A total number of ten parties 
implies that we can expect a correct prediction of the vote for about nine 
percent of our respondents (combining the missing values on the vote-varia- 
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Fig. 3. Actual and predicted votes (means and 95% -confidence intervals). 
bleas a separate ‘party’) by simply assuming random voting. This line of 
reasoning relies on the assumption that we do not know anything about the 
differences in size of the parties. However, if the sample is split into two 
halves, than the distribution of the votes in the first sample can be used to 
calculate the chance that a randomly selected voter will vote for some party. 
Assuming that each and every respondent in the second subsample votes for 
the largest party in the first subsample (i.e. CDA) leads to the correct pre- 
diction of 33.3 percent of the actual votes in that second subsample. So, the 
power of our model is an increase of the number of correct predictions from 
33.3 percent to 40.1 percent if we accept a very generous rule to count correct 
predictions. This result seems hardly worth the effort of the use of sophisti- 
cated statistical methods. 
The results of these computations make clear that it is one thing to fit and 
estimate a model, but something quite different to predict actual outcomes. 
The elaborated model presented in Fig. 2 summarizes the tendencies in the 
covariance structures of the data in a satisfactory way and it can be used to 
discuss explanations of voting and party preferences. However, limited theo- 
retical understanding of the decision-making process leading to the choice of 
some party, and rather crude and imperfect ways to measure central variables, 
prevent the precise prediction of the actual vote of a considerable part of the 
respondents in the second subsample. 
This distinction between tendencies and precise outcomes is illustrated in 
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Fig. 3 .  In this diagram the mean predicted party votes and the 95%-confidence 
intervals are depicted for every party in the analysis. Fig. 3 shows that there 
exist remarkable inter-party differences in the dispersion of the predicted 
votes. The model seems to be much more accurate in predicting the vote for a 
small party like the PSP than for a party like the large CDA. This cannot be 
ascribed to a distinction between large or ideological diffuse parties on the one 
hand, and small or ideological puritan parties on the other, because small 
parties like SGP or CPN are less concentrated than the PSP, or even the PvdA. 
These differences in ‘homogeneity’ among voters for Dutch parties has been 
noted before (Van Deth 1984: 194-196). The number of cases in the present 
data set is too restricted to perform a more detailed analysis of this phenom- 
enon. 
6 .  Conclusion 
We have tried to disentangle the constraints between so-called new and old 
political polarizations and their impacts on voting or party preference. It 
appeared that voting is most strongly related to the left-right placement of the 
respondents. However, that does not mean that the materialist/postmaterialist 
value orientation is irrelevant for the interpretation of voting behaviour. In 
fact, it turns out that left-right placement is directly and strongly dependent on 
this value orientation. This result has important consequences for the explana- 
tion of voting and party preferences, and the understanding of the actual 
meanings of the terms left and right. 
The decline of social class-voting in advanced industrial societies has been 
illustrated by many authors. Using the familiar Alford Index of Class Voting, 
the decline of the tendency of manual workers to vote for left parties is clearly 
discernable in several countries in the past thirty years (Franklin 1985, Lipset 
1981: 504, Inglehart 1987: 8). Since the number of people voting for these 
parties has not declined, the relevance of class or class conflict for voting 
behaviour must have been weakened considerably. In other words, the in- 
terpretation of left and right cannot be based on some implicit or vague 
reference to the traditional proletarian and bourgeois background of these 
terms captured under even more vague labels like ‘social economic cleavages’ 
or ‘socio-economic conflict dimension’. The terms left and right - as Inglehart 
and Rabier (1986: 470) remark- are ‘. . . like a universal solvent, (that) tend to 
absorb whatever major conflicts are present in the political system’. The 
analyses presented here show that the dominant cleavage transformed into left 
and right terms, is the conflict over new non-economic issues. In the 1980s, the 
issues that determine the specific location on the left-right dimension to a high 
degree, are included in the materialist/postmaterialist value ~oncep t . ’~  
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The fact that electorates consequently stick to the use of the left-right 
dimension should not lead to the superficial conclusion that this dimension is 
the key factor for understanding voting behaviour or party preference. Behind 
this placement we find the materialist/postmaterialist value orientation as the 
present-day interpretation of the dominant political conflict in advanced in- 
dustrial society. This explanation of the specific location on the left-right 
dimension transforms the trivial observation that left people prefer left parties 
into a theoretically relevant statement. 
Finally, a more methodologically oriented remark should be made. Using 
sophisticated research techniques like LISREL leads to probabilistic conclu- 
sions based on the statistical tendencies in the covariance structures of the data 
set. Obviously, this type of information differs from the much more exact 
determination of factors required for the correct prediction of the score on 
some dependent variable. The analyses presented in this article illustrates the 
clear limitations of our theoretical understanding and measurement of the 
relevant determinants of actual voting behaviour. Since the final proof of 
understanding and explanation in empirical research is prediction, analysis of 
voting behaviour should not be limited to the search for structure in covariance 
matrices but, consequently, show its power by predicting the actual votes of 
respondents. 
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Notes 
1. ‘By ‘‘left’’ we shall mean advocating social change in the direction of greater equality - 
political, economic or social; by “right” we shall mean supporting a traditional, more or less 
hierarchical social order, and opposing change toward greater equality’ (Lipset et  al., 1954: 
1135). 
2. See Laponce (1981) for the interpretion of the terms left and right. 
3. This theory has been discussed by Inglehart in many publications. See Inglehart (1977) or 
(1981). Recent findings are mentioned in Inglehart (1987) and Inglehart and Rabier (1986). 
4. See Inglehart and Klingemann (1976) for the introduction of this problem and its place in the 
development of research on party preferences or voting. 
5. See, for some information on the format of these instruments and their validity, Van Deth 
(1983). 
6. In the Netherlands this method has been applied for about twenty years. See Van der Eijk and 
Niemoller (1983: 247-250) for an overview of the results. 
7. Bijleveld (1984) characterized the four largest parties in the Netherlands on the basis of their 
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party programme. With the help of content analysis he could pin down the extent to which the 
party was to be characterized as left-right and postmaterialistic. None of the differences 
between the characteristics of the programme of the four parties studied appeared to be 
significant. 
8. C. van der Eijk, B. Niemoller, and A.Th.J. Eggen, Dutch Parliamentary Election Study1981, 
Amsterdam: FSW-A. The data can be obtained from the Steinmetz Archives in Amsterdam 
(ICPSR study number 791211). 
9. Eurobarometer 11 was left out of our analyses because it does not incorporate the standard 
instrument to measure the materialist/postmaterialist value orientation. 
10. The phrase ‘potential voters’ is used instead of ‘voters’ because the question refers to 
prospective hehaviour: ‘If there were a general election tomorrow, which party would you 
11. See Van Deth (1983: 423) for the details of this variant of the materialist/postmaterialist 
instrument. 
12. Joreskog developed a computer programme which makes it possible to combine linear 
regression analysis with factor analysis. The problem we have to solve here is a typical 
LISREL-problem, for we have a latent variable ‘vote’ which is measured by four indicators. 
We used the LISREL VI version of the programme (Joreskog and Sorbom 1984). 
13. Because the materialist/postmaterialist variable is of an ordinal character and the number of 
distinct scores is limited, we use polyserial correlations (Joreskog and Sorbom 1984: IV.l-3). 
For this reason, and because the indicators of the vote are not normal distributed, we use the 
Unweighted Least Squares technique as the estimation method. Since no chi-square test nor 
standardization are applied, the parameters of the estimated models in this article must be 
handled with care. They function only to illustrate that the links between the variables are 
substantial. Just to have some indication of the meaning of the parameters in relation to the 
estimated variable, we have reported the variances of the most important estimated variables. 
As a measure of the goodness of fit of the model on the whole, we use the adjusted goodness of 
fit index as suggested by Joreskog and Sorbom (1984: 1.36-1.42). As an indicator of the degree 
of explanation of voting and the other endogenous variables, we use the squared multiple 
correlation. To judge the fit of the ‘individual’ parameters, the most important aspects of the 
residuals of the correlation matrix are reported. As a rule of thumb we use the old criterion of 
causal analysis that residuals of .10 or less are reasonable low. 
14. By not allowing correlated residuals a confirmatory factor analysis does not lead to meaning- 
ful results because of a misspecification of the model on this data. 
15. Actually we find a non-positive definite matrix of residuals in the measurement model (in 
LISREL-terms: the TE-matrix). 
16. As far as the results of the testing of the complement model and the rejection model could be 
interpreted, these solutions resemble very much the two good fitting solutions, that is, the 
measurement models are the same but the explanatory models deviate. 
17. See Inglehart (1977) and Van Deth (1984) for the interpretations of these relationships. There 
are two reasons for omitting the usual class variable. In the dataset the subjective status has 
been asked. In our view it is not clear what is measured by this question. It could be the 
education of the respondent, it could be the job (not the occupation) or it could be some 
reference to a solidarity grouping. Secondly, the left-right placement is classically connected 
with class in a more marxist sense. In that case, the accent has to lay on  the relationship to the 
means of production. In  this way ‘class’ is theoretical meaningful (see for example Wright and 
Martin 1987). 
support?’. 
18. See the previous note for relevant references. 
19. The theoretical and operational differences have been presented above. The main technical 
difference is that we use the unweighted least squares technique to estimate the parameters 
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20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
and so, that we do not present standardized solutions (see note 12). While Van der Eijk and 
Niemoller discriminate between continuous variables and discrete variables and compute 
different types of correlation coefficients (1986,1987), they simply use the default routine of 
the LISREL-program for the estimation of their models. In this way, they seem to overlook 
the implications of measurement levels and distributions of the variables for selecting an 
estimation technique and the standardization of the parameters. 
The exact formula is: 
Actual Vote = .271 * (Yo voteleft - 21.243)/23.813 
- ,360 * (YO voteright - 26.881)/21.376 
+ ,093 * (YO votepostm - 17.362)/12.586 
- .lo3 * (%votemat - 32.000)/8.879 
The following formula is used: 
Predicted Vote = - ,142 * ( ,402 * 
+.158 * 
- ,244 * 
-.124 * 
- 1.112 * ( ,255 * 
+ ,021 * 
+ ,084 * 
- .779 * 
(postmat - .000)/.896 
(age - 40.853)/16.239 
(education - 4.494)/2.687 
(income - 7.146)/2.994) 
(leftright - 5.402)/2.397 
(education - 4.494)/2.687 
(sex - .000)/.799 
(.402 * (postmat - .000)/.896 
- ,244 * (age - 40.853)/16.239 
+ ,158 * (education - 4.494)/2.687 
- ,124 * (income - 7.146)/2.994) 
The variables materialism/postmaterialism and left-right are part of the measurement model 
of the Beta-matrix. These parameters are, therefore, factor regression coefficients from the 
manifest to the latent variables. Materialism/postmaterialism and sex arc taken as ordinal, 
respectively nominal variables and so polychoric or polyserial correlation coefficients are used 
for these variables in the model. Normalized values are computed with the PRELIS-program 
(Joreskog and Sorbom 1986). 
Actually, we calculated the midpoints between the parties, estimated the party score, and 
counted the number of correct predictions. 
See, for a more extensive analysis of the relevance of materialist/postmaterialist issues for the 
left-right placement of individuals, Inglehart and Rabier (1986: 471). 
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